University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Court Review: The Journal of the American
Judges Association

American Judges Association

2012

Ready for the Psychologists: Learning from Eyewitness Errors
James M. Doyle
National Institute of Justice

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview

Doyle, James M., "Ready for the Psychologists: Learning from Eyewitness Errors" (2012). Court Review:
The Journal of the American Judges Association. 379.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview/379

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the American Judges Association at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Court Review: The Journal of
the American Judges Association by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska Lincoln.

Ready for the Psychologists:
Learning from Eyewitness Errors
James M. Doyle

O

be ready for the psychologists.”4
Various signs and portents—among them, this special
issue—indicate that the courts finally are ready to mobilize the
lessons taught by Munsterberg and his heirs; or at least that the
courts are ready to take steps to get ready. This is an important
moment in the vexed history of the law and eyewitness psychology relationship.
To understand where we are it helps to understand a little
about both how we got here and where we could be going. The
“friendly and energetic alliance” will have more than one path
to choose from as it moves ahead. The path that realizes the
fullest potential of the alliance is not the most obvious path,
and finding it will require a new examination of the deep
nature of the catalyst—the devastating catalog of DNA exonerations in eyewitness cases—that is pushing us forward.
Something more than a minor adjustment to judicial practice is called for here: this is an opportunity for judicial leadership.

ver a century ago, Dean John Henry Wigmore published a famous demolition of pioneering psychologist
Hugo Munsterberg in the Illinois Law Review.1
Munsterberg had complained in his best seller, On the Witness
Stand, that while other disciplines and professions were hustling to learn the lessons about eyewitness memory that his
new field of experimental psychology was beginning to teach,
“the lawyer alone is obdurate.”2 Munsterberg charged that the
lawyers chose traditional primitive ignorance over scientific
enlightenment. Wigmore could not sit still for that. His satirical response is still remembered by psychologists as the bloodthirsty slaughter of psychology as a discipline by the greatest
evidence scholar that the Anglo-American tradition ever produced: a grisly paradigm of the kind of welcome social scientists should expect from the legal system and its practitioners.
If this is what you get from the great Wigmore, researchers reasoned, just imagine the treatment you will receive from an
ordinary legal tribesman.
Wigmore’s withering cross-examination of the wretched
“Professor Muensterberg” in this article is so lengthy and so
humiliating that there are moments when a slightly creepy
sadistic pleasure seems to be animating the dean. But sadism
wasn’t the problem. The problem was Wigmore’s cloddish professorial attempts at humor—Wigmore’s sarcasm created a misimpression that he tried to correct for the rest of his life.
Wigmore did want to issue a call to order: to correct
Munsterberg’s overstatements and to address Munsterberg’s
misapprehensions about legal practice. But Wigmore was far
from an enemy of psychology as a discipline; he was actually
one of psychology’s earliest advocates, the best legal friend that
psychology had.
The real purpose of Wigmore’s article was to illuminate the
potential in a law and psychology relationship and to throw his
prestige behind its inception. Wigmore’s goal was to herald the
day when the lawyers and psychologists could move forward
in “a friendly and energetic alliance in the noble cause of justice.”3 Yes, Munsterberg had jumped the gun in announcing
the immediate utility of such an alliance; Wigmore thought
that was still on the distant horizon. Even so, Wigmore looked
forward to the day of its arrival, and he was confident that day
would come. “When the psychologists are ready for the
courts,” he announced in a subsequent piece, “the courts will

Hugo Munsterberg’s pronouncements on the usefulness of
contemporary psychology were overconfident and premature,
but they were also remarkably prescient in anticipating future
research. Munsterberg began to explain some of eyewitness
memory’s mechanisms and some of its particular dangers. He
showed, for example, that humans do not have a permanent
stable memory capacity like a videotape or a DVR available to
be summoned for accurate replay whenever required. He
showed that memory was malleable and reconstructive.5 He
also showed how forensic evaluations of memory evidence
could go astray. For example, he showed that a witness’s confidence was an unreliable indicator of the witness’s accuracy.6
But for current purposes, Munsterberg’s method was as important as his findings.
Munsterberg’s signature tool (at least for public display) was
the staged demonstration. A man interrupts a lecture; he yells;
he fires a gun; later, the audience of eyewitnesses is questioned
about the event. Next, inaccuracies in the audience’s responses
are totaled. The number of errors in the witnesses’ responses is
shocking. Lots of eyewitnesses make lots of mistakes. These
results grabbed attention, but they were not terribly useful for
the legal system. They indicated that there were many mistakes,

Footnotes
1. John H. Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg and the Psychology of
Testimony: Being a Report of the Case of Cokestone v. Muensterberg,
3 ILL. L. REV. 399 (1909).
2. HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1908). The story of
the encounter and its aftermath is told in some detail in JAMES M.
DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: COPS, COURTS, SCIENCE, AND THE BATTLE
AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATION (2005).

3. Wigmore, supra note 1, at 406. In fact, Wigmore may have had a
better grasp of contemporary psychological research than
Munsterberg himself. See Brian H. Bornstein & Steven D. Penrod,
Hugo Who? G.F. Arnold’s Alternative Early Approach to Psychology
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6. Id., at 56.

4 Court Review - Volume 48

DIAGNOSES AND PROBABILITIES

and they argued for an increased general skepticism about eyewitness accounts. But, as Wigmore pointed out, the legal system’s concern is not with the general reliability of witnesses as
a class; it is with the reliability of particular verdicts in individual cases. The legal problem arose in separating the mistaken
from the correct—not the rate of mistakes, but their distribution. There, Munsterberg had little or nothing practical to offer.
When Robert Buckhout picked up Munsterberg’s fallen banner in the 1970s, he relied on a modernized version of the
same approach.7 For example, he induced a New York television station to broadcast a staged crime and invite viewers to
make choices from a staged lineup. The number of correct
identifications this process yielded was lower than would have
been achieved by random guessing.8 But while his method may
have been similar, Buckhout’s temperament was very different
from Munsterberg’s. Munsterberg was an academic who
retreated when faced with Wigmore’s onslaught. Buckhout
knew his science, but he was a happy warrior, a cheerful agitator who carried the battle into the courts and into the popular
media. He not only accepted opposition, he gloried in it.
He published an accessible survey article on eyewitness
error in Scientific American.9 He testified on the unreliability of
eyewitness testimony in the trial of California radical Angela
Davis and was instrumental in winning her acquittal. He seized
every opportunity to comment in the media (for example,
opining on the case of a butcher identifying his own pork
chops from a pork-chop lineup) where the lessons of eyewitness psychology could be taught. His science was aligned with
his politics. He believed that criminal defendants, particularly
poor and minority indigent defendants, were getting screwed
by the legal system’s complacent reliance on an antique view of
how memory worked. He made an enormous impact, and he
almost immediately rallied two groups of partners.
The first group was a cohort of idealistic younger psychologists, like Elizabeth Loftus, who were anxious to see their science have an impact in the world. Loftus attacked the eyewitness issue in a radically different way: she “did science” in the
form of rigorously controlled experiments, changing one variable while holding all others constant. The results she began to
produce were striking. She showed, for example, that when
questions about a white barn were introduced into interrogations of witnesses who had viewed a film of an auto accident,
over 20% of those viewers later reported seeing a white barn
although in fact there had been no white barn in the film.10
This was a crucial finding for eyewitness cases: it showed that
eyewitness memory not only decayed, but also changed. It
showed how a witness could not only forget the right man but
also—after being unknowingly influenced by viewing mug
shots or show-ups (which operate as “post-event information”
like the white barn in an interview question)—could remember the wrong man.

Loftus’s findings mounted
Loftus’s research
quickly, and they went to the
“showed how a
heart of the eyewitness experience. Taken together they indi- witness could not
cated that in an eyewitness case,
only forget the
the memory of the witness is for
right man but
all practical purposes the scene
of the crime. They showed that
also... could
memory evidence was in effect
remember the
“trace evidence”: difficult to colwrong man.”
lect, easy to contaminate, but
impossible to test for contamination after any contamination has occurred. At the same time,
Loftus’s scrupulous scientific methods were winning her work
admission to the blue-ribbon, peer-reviewed academic journals,
and encouraging younger academic psychologists to extend
and challenge her research. You could study eyewitnesses and
have a scholarly career. Experimental findings such as Loftus’s
(unlike the demonstrations of Munsterberg and Buckhout)
could be replicated or falsified. The number of published studies multiplied.11
And at this point, Buckhout’s second group of recruits, the
desperate criminal defense lawyers, joined in. Buckhout’s testimony in the Angela Davis case got their attention, and his
Scientific American article quickly circulated through the
defense bar. Elizabeth Loftus published her popular general
audience account of eyewitness science, Eyewitness
Testimony,12 at about this time, and that was buttressed by an
influential Stanford Law Review comment written by Frederick
Woocher (a trained psychologist, then in law school), which
provided a blueprint for arguments for conveying psychological science through expert witnesses. Defense lawyers began to
demand the admission of expert testimony by Loftus,
Buckhout, and their colleagues, aimed at debunking faith in
eyewitness evidence.
This point of entry was bad luck for anyone who hoped for
a “friendly and energetic alliance.” That wasn’t obvious at the
time. Persistent litigation over admissibility did help to keep
the issue of eyewitness science alive in the courts, and feedback from skeptical courts did help to provoke new, better-targeted research. But these benefits came at a steep price.
The initial environment has affected discussions of eyewitness science ever since. Admissibility questions arise at the
most acutely adversarial moments of the criminal process, and
their resolution (at least in the eyes of the advocates) may
determine who wins and who loses. Prosecutors—goaded by
inflammatory rhetoric from Buckhout—quickly denounced
eyewitness findings as enemy pseudoscience: a trick designed
to let criminals go free by unnerving credulous lay jurors and
sliming all eyewitnesses, most of who were right, and many of
who were crime victims. For many prosecutors—then and

7. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 49-68, discusses Buckhout’s history and
influence.
8. Robert Buckhout, Nearly 2,000 Witnesses Can Be Wrong, 2 SOCIAL
ACTION & L. 7 (1975).
9. Robert Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231 SCI. AM. 23 (1974).
10. Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile

Destruction: An Example of the Interaction Between Language and
Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 585 (1974).
11. BRIAN CUTLER & STEVEN PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW (1995).
12. ELIZABETH LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
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now—eyewitness science is simply a shield for the guilty. For
many judges, the cumulative
price of the skirmishing over
marginally interesting science
the experts offered seemed enormous in terms of hours, dollars,
and distended docket backlog.
While the battles over admissibility of expert testimony continued to grind on, another of
Buckhout’s recruits, Gary Wells,
was engineering a paradigm shift.13 Wells admired Loftus and
accepted her findings as good science, but he also pointed out
their limited utility.
Precisely because Loftus was a scrupulous scientist, she isolated and studied a single factor (e.g., the wording of a question, the stress of the event, the presence of post-event information) at a time. Wells noted that these studies yielded statistical results that could tell you what happened eight times
out of ten, but could not tell you whether this case was one of
the eight, or one of the two. Even worse, every criminal event
incorporates many factors, not just one, and there was no science-based mechanism for combining these factors and assessing their interactions. From Wells’s point of view, offering posthoc diagnosis of eyewitness error from the witness stand was
the wrong way to mobilize the solid (but inherently probability-based) science that Loftus and a generation of their colleagues were producing.14
Wells successfully argued for the new orientation that has
dominated criminal justice policy discussions about eyewitnesses for the past decade. He noted that some factors Loftus
had studied (e.g., lighting, age of witness, stress of event) are
not under the criminal justice system’s control. He called these
“estimator variables.” But he also noted that there were other
factors (e.g., lineup construction, lineup administration, witness interview technique) that the system’s actors do have
power over. If you understood how these “system variables”
could be modernized, you could reduce the rate of error. Wells
argued that preventing mistakes by identifying new best practices in investigation would be better than trying to catch mistakes from the witness stand after they happened. A torrent of
research followed, exploring and refining new elements of “system-variable” design. The task of psychological science in this
conception was the prevention of eyewitness errors as evidence
was being produced, not the retrospective inspection of eyewitness testimony to see if an error had occurred. That research has
now coalesced around the “double-blind sequential” photo-

“Wells argued
that preventing
mistakes [during
the] investigation
would be better
than trying
to catch
mistakes....”

13. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 142-167.
14. Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System
Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1546 (1978).
15. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 163-170.
16. See generally ELIZABETH LOFTUS, JAMES M. DOYLE & JENNIFER
DYSART, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (4th ed. 2007)
at 369-377.
17. Laura Smalarz & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence:
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array and lineup protocol discussed later in this issue.
Then, just as that research matured, the DNA exoneration
cases arrived. The eyewitness cases dominated the lists of
wrongful convictions; the system-variable research was well
developed, and its salience was immediately obvious.
Influential actors such as Attorney General Janet Reno were
eager to apply the researchers’ lessons.15 Expert-witness litigation does continue, and a gradual but definite trend toward the
admission of eyewitness expert testimony in trials has gained
momentum in the courts.16 But the policy conversation has
turned toward prevention: toward the design of system-variable “best practice” reforms of lineup and other investigative
procedures. An accelerating wave of jurisdictions has been
adopting the science-based eyewitness-evidence protocols.
If this is where we are, then where are we going? The
answer to that question will depend in part on how we understand the lessons of the DNA eyewitness exoneration cases.
THE WRONG MAN AND THE WRONG PATIENT

Wigmore’s “friendly and energetic alliance” received a dramatic push forward from the exoneration cases, but it would
be a mistake to settle for the most obvious lessons that the eyewitness wrongful convictions seem to offer.
Smalarz and Wells are not wrong when they write that “[a]n
increasingly strong case can be made for the argument that
mistaken-eyewitness identification is the primary cause of the
conviction of the innocent in the United States,”17 but their
familiar formulation uses “cause” in a shorthand sense that
may mask both the complexity of the issue and the opportunities for mobilizing science in reform that the collision of eyewitness psychology and the DNA exonerations provide.
One very good way to see those complexities and opportunities is to examine contemporary medicine’s encounter with
its own version of the problem.
Just as the criminal justice system is haunted by the fact that
it sometimes convicts the wrong man, medicine is haunted by
the fact that it sometimes operates on the wrong patient. But
when modern medical researchers began to look carefully into
wrong-patient events, they uncovered surprising insights. For
example, one intensive examination of a wrong-patient surgery
discovered not just one but at least seventeen errors. The
patient’s face was draped so that the physicians could not see
it; a resident left the lab assuming the attending physician had
ordered the invasive surgery without telling him; conflicting
charts were overlooked; and contradictory patient stickers
were ignored. But the crucial point for the researchers was that
no single one of the seventeen errors they catalogued could have
caused the wrong-patient surgery by itself.18

Scientific Advances and the New Burden on Trial Judges, 48 CT. REV.
14, 14 (2012) (this issue). Recent investigations of non-DNA
exonerations indicate that false testimony cases may outnumber
eyewitness cases in certain varieties of false convictions. NATIONAL
OF
http://www.law.umich.edu/
REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS,
special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited July 9, 2012).
18. Mark R. Chassin & Elise C. Becher, The Wrong Patient, 136 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 826, 829-31 (2002).

Analysis showed not only mistakes by individual doctors
and nurses, but also latent systemic problems.
Communications among staff were terrible; computer systems
did not share information. When teams failed to function, no
one was surprised or bothered because of a culture of low
expectations that “led [staff] to conclude that these red flags
signified not unusual, worrisome harbingers but rather mundane repetitions of the poor communication to which they
become inured.”19 Deviations from good practice had become
normal, and a tragedy resulted.
What this meant to medical reformers was that the lessons
of closely studied events such as the Chernobyl meltdown and
the space shuttle Challenger launch disaster could be applied
to healthcare. Like those tragedies, the wrong-patient surgery
was an “organizational accident.” No single error is sufficient
to cause an organizational accident; the errors of many individuals (“active errors”) converge and interact with system
weaknesses (“latent conditions”), increasing the likelihood
that individual errors will do harm. The practitioners and organizations involved in these tragedies did not choose to make
errors—they drifted into them.20 The disasters required no villains; they involved normal people, doing normal work, in
normal organizations.21 They suffered, in Charles Perrow’s
memorable phrase, “normal accidents.”22 Like the Challenger
launch decision, the medical tragedies were caused by “mistake[s] embedded in the banality of organizational life.”23
These insights apply to a wrong-man conviction.24 Our traditional wrongful-conviction narrative (the witness picked the
wrong guy; the cops and the D.A. believed her; so did the jury)
is not adequate. Nor is it adequate to isolate the performance
of one operator or the imperfections one investigative technique employed in the case—for example, the traditional nonblind, simultaneous lineup—as either a sole cause or a silverbullet solution.
Lots of things have to go wrong before the wrong man is
convicted. Yes, the witness has to choose the wrong man from
an array, but the police have to put him into the array in the
first place and design the format of the array and the execution
of the identification. Forensic evidence on the crime scene
could have been overlooked or, although properly collected
and tested in the lab, distorted in the courtroom presentation.
Cell-phone records, Metrocard data, or other alibi information
could have been ignored. Tunnel vision, augmented by clearance rate and caseload pressures from above, may have overwhelmed the investigators and the prosecutors. Poorly funded
or untrained defense counsel may have failed to investigate
alternative explanations or to execute effective cross-examination. The witness erred; the cops erred; the technicians erred;
the prosecutors erred; the defense erred; the judge and the jury
erred; the appellate court erred, too. No single one of these
errors would have been enough without the others. The errors

combined and cascaded; then
“When we
there was a tragedy—and a “noask who is
villains” tragedy at that.
When we ask who is responresponsible for
sible for a wrongful conviction,
a wrongful
the right answer is usually
conviction, the
“everyone involved,” to one
degree or another—if not by
right answer is
making a mistake, then by fail- usually ‘everyone
ing to catch one. And “everyinvolved’...”
one” includes not only cops and
lawyers at the sharp end of the
system, but also legislators, policymakers, funders, and appellate judges far from the scene of the events who dictated the
conditions under which the sharp-end operators work. Look
twice at the DNA-exposed wrongful convictions and you see
that, as Charles Perrow noted, “[T]ime and again, the operator
is confronted by unexpected and usually mysterious interactions among failures, [so that] saying that he should have
zigged instead of zagged is possible only after the fact.”25 This
is as true of a whole spectrum of criminal justice errors—mistaken releases, prisoners lost in prisons, and cold cases that
stayed cold too long—as it is of wrongful convictions.
The habit of treating horrific wrongful convictions as single-cause events, and then totaling up, ranking, and prioritizing these causes, has produced useful innovations such as the
double-blind sequential protocol and, in some places, has led
those reforms to be integrated into practice, but it does not
really engage the deeper nature of the problem. The solutions
it has generated stop short of fundamentally improving future
system reliability.
All new sets of best practices or checklists have to operationalized and executed, and they have to be maintained, monitored, evaluated, and perhaps junked and replaced when environments change or science advances. No new set of best identification practices can cover every circumstance, so an irreducible zone of discretion always survives, and operators are
forced to manage life within that zone. From the moment it is
written, every new checklist is under immediate and constant
assault from clearance-rate pressure, docket-list backlog, and
other environmental factors. “Drift” toward failure remains a
threat to our new best practices just as it was to their discredited predecessors. No one had more checklists than NASA;
NASA launched Challenger anyway.
Many tragic mishaps could never have been predicted (and
cannot now be explained) by reference to the features of individual component parts. These tragedies are “emergent”
events, results of the “greater than the sum of its parts” properties inherent in all systems.26 Going “down and in” to find a
broken component will not be enough to explain these happenings; we also have to go “up and out” to assess the envi-

19. Id., at 829-830.
20. SIDNEY DEKKER, DRIFT INTO FAILURE (2011).
21. SIDNEY DEKKER, JUST CULTURE (2007).
22. CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS (1984).
23. DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY
TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA, xiv (1996).

24. This argument is made at greater length and in greater detail in
James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010).
25. PERROW, supra note 22, at 9.
26. DEKKER, supra note 20.
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ronment that chose the component, allowed the component to fail, and made the failure catastrophic.27 Making
good design choices between
alternative single components
of the criminal process (e.g.,
between “simultaneous” and
“sequential” lineups) will aid
progress but it won’t finally
answer the challenge.
It is axiomatic in high-reliability organizations that optimizing individual components is a
poor route to overall system quality.28 The double-blind
sequential-lineup protocol is a more conservative screening test
for guilt, but it isn’t a perfect one.29 Individual cases with idiosyncratic histories will still have to be decided. Even after modernizing reforms, judges will still have to answer the question
that medicine asks when offered a more conservative screening
test for, say, prostate cancer or breast cancer: What does the rest
of our system do with this new pattern of test results?
Could a “friendly and energetic alliance” of science and
legal procedure give us new tools to “screen out” the higher
number of cases that less conservative show-ups or traditional
simultaneous lineups currently “screen in?” Or give us alternative ways to apprehend the perpetrators “missed” in the new,
more conservative sequential lineups? To help judges gauge
the impact of minor variations from accepted “best practice”?
To develop a “forward-looking accountability” that helps us
understand past mistakes to prevent future ones?
The answer to all of these questions will be “no” unless the
judiciary plays an informed part. If eyewitness science does
advance Wigmore’s “noble cause of justice,” it won’t happen in
a single clap of thunder; it will happen as working judges apply
the science with delicacy, to small details, in many decisions,
and throughout the lives of many cases.

“A modern
approach to
‘best practices’
in collecting
eyewitnessmemory evidence
is plainly
called for....”

PRODUCERS AND INSPECTORS

Detectives speak of making cases; lawyers speak of trying
them. The police operate a production stage in which they
construct the case; the lawyers are elements of an inspection
stage, during which the legal system evaluates the investigators’ product.
Judges can have an important impact on improving both the
production stage and the inspection stage if they master the

27. Id.
28. Donald Berwick, Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Healthcare,
320 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 53, 53-55 (1989).
29. GARY L. WELLS, NANCY K. STEBLAY, & JENNIFER E. DYSART, A TEST OF
THE SIMULTANEOUS VS. SEQUENTIAL LINEUP METHODS (2011).
30. See, e.g., Susan Gaertner & John Harrington, Successful Eyewitness
Identification Reform: Ramsey County’s Blind Sequential Lineup
Protocol, POLICE CHIEF, Apr. 2009, at 26 ; Amy Klobuchar et al.,
Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County’s Blind
Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS
J. 381 (2006).
31. This is qualified by the fact that a better understanding of the fundamental nature of eyewitness memory should make it clear to

8 Court Review - Volume 48

basics of the eyewitness science. Something like that happened
in medicine. When medical reformers accepted the “organizational accident” model of “iatrogenic” (caused by doctors or
treatment) injuries to patients and understood that they were
system errors, and not just the work of “bad apples,” they
opened a window both on a more comprehensive understanding
of past events and a more productive way to move forward as a
profession to prevent future tragedies. Wrongful convictions are
“iatrogenic” too, and judges can do something about them.
Direct judicial intervention in the business of producing
evidence in eyewitness cases dates from at least the Warren
Court’s exclusionary-rule cases in the 1970s. As several contributors to this issue point out, the scientific findings of recent
decades have substantially undermined the Warren’s Court’s
analysis of the problem. The sort of conscious police misconduct that can be deterred by exclusion is not the predominate
issue, and the “reliability” test that the Warren Court instituted
is largely obsolete. A modern approach to “best practices” in
collecting eyewitness-memory evidence is plainly called for,
and to their credit the law-enforcement authorities that must
execute any best practices are moving to use science-based
principles to renovate their procedures.30
In this new context, exclusive reliance on the “nuclear
option” of complete suppression of identification testimony
every time some investigator varies marginally from the new
“best practices” will be unworkable. This doesn’t mean that
mistakes are inconsequential, but it does seem clear that judges
will only rarely face one simple “in/out” decision about eyewitness testimony,31 while they will frequently (often many times
within the same case) face smaller opportunities to exercise discretion about the admissibility of elements of testimony, the
control of experts, the drafting of limiting instructions, and the
provision of cautionary instructions,32 to deal with variances
from the new accepted practices. Judges’ careful, graduated
responses to the impacts of suboptimal practices will become
crucial to their supervision of the production phase of cases.33
The accuracy of these responses will depend on the individual judge’s knowledge of the basics of the science of memory, not on the judge’s mastery of broad lines of precedential
appellate authority.34 It is important, to take one example, that
judges understand that the “strength” of a memory is a crucial
factor in calculating the harm likely to have been caused by a
suboptimal investigative practice. A “strong memory” formed
in a lengthy encounter in bright light in calm conditions will
be less affected by later procedural shortcomings than a

judges that the idea of an “independent source” for courtroom testimony subsequent to a biased pretrial identification comes close
to being a convenient fiction. See, e.g., Brandon Garrett,
Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VANDERBILT L. REV. 201 (2012).
32. See Brian H. Bornstein & Joseph A. Hamm, Jury Instructions on
Witness Identification 48 CT. REV. 22 (2012) (this issue).
33. See generally Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, A Method for
Analyzing the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Cases,
48 CT. REV. 22, 24-34 (2012) (this issue). For examples of courts
wrestling with this recognition, see Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J.
2011); Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782 (2009).
34. Smalarz and Wells, supra note 17.

“weak” memory formed in a fleeting, violent episode. But it is
also crucial that the judges making assessments understand
the sources of “strength of memory” and remember that
“strength of memory” is not the same as “witness confidence.”
Often, witnesses’ self-reports of “strength” indicate only memory contamination, not meaningful memory “strength.”35
The final inspection stage of the criminal process—the jury
trial—does address the diagnostic problem that Gary Wells
emphasized in his path-breaking “system-variable” article: the
riddle of how to combine the psychological factors present in an
event and investigation that impact eyewitness reliability. The
trial uses an ancient but flexible aggregating device: narrative.
Jurors do not count and weigh piles of factors, or apply Bayesian
formulae to arrive at probabilities; they generate and assess stories.36 In the minds of the jurors, the psychological factors interact over time as a narrative unfolds. This feature of our inspection stage also has a fundamental political importance: the laycitizen jury’s one-time concentration on a specific unique narrative provides a bracing challenge to the official practitioners’
endemic tendency to believe that since we know the odds in our
fields we can simply play those odds. The professionals tend to
believe that if we know what happens 90% (or 80%, or even
51%) of the time, then we know what to do 100% of the time. If
things go right under the story model, every accused gets an
individualized jury judgment, not a roll of the probabilistic dice.
An important part of the trial judge’s role is to manage the
“story-model” core of the jurors’ work, and the science of identification indicates that eyewitness cases present particularly
difficult problems in this regard. This task doesn’t require a
Ph.D. in psychology, but it does require more than reading
appellate-suppression and expert-testimony precedents.
Many jurors, if left to their own devices, will default to a
“videotape” story—the witness recorded the event like a camera, stored it on a permanent tape, and is now replaying it—
that is contradicted by the scientific truth that memory evidence is malleable “trace evidence.” It is also pretty clear that
traditional tools such as cross-examination will be insufficient
to convey much of the new science of memory because the
jurors’ vulnerability is not on the level of specific missing
pieces of data (e.g., “the witness was/was not confident”) but
on the level of the general background interpretive principles
that no cross-examiner can reach (e.g., “confidence means
accuracy”) no matter how clever his or her questions.37
The “estimator variable” story of the crime event must be
complemented by the “system variable” story of the investigation before the story-model inspection can be effective. The
eyewitness research indicates that in administering the story
model, judges will have to attend to not only general juror
“common-sense” principles that may be mistaken, but also
specific pieces of data that scientists have learned are necessary
to the story-testing process but that upstream operators have

not preserved or disclosed.
“[J]udges must
These data will not be available
incorporate into
unless science-informed judges
act to make them available.
their daily
This means that judges must
practice... the
incorporate into their daily pracproduction and
tice the recognition that the production and the inspection
the inspection
stages of an eyewitness-based
stages of an
prosecution are reciprocally
related. Inevitably, while the eyewitness-based
prosecution....”
judges “downstream” are trying
to adjust for the exigencies of
upstream investigative operations, the “upstream” law-enforcement operators are trying to adjust their conduct in anticipation
of the inspection that awaits their cases downstream.
It is axiomatic in medicine and other industries that end-ofprocess inspection schemes, although necessary components of
their systems, are poor routes to overall system quality.38
Practitioners who are subject to inspection are resourceful in
both avoiding the inspection altogether or in gaming the
inspection when they cannot avoid it. Those being inspected
usually end up owning the process, and their primary goal is
usually their own safety. Criminal-justice-system operators are
not immune to these tendencies. The fact that only a tiny portion of criminal cases receives jury scrutiny certainly has something to do with the costs of jury trials in terms of time and
money, but it also reflects professional practitioners’ disinclination to submit to inspection by unpredictable lay jurors, especially when that inspection takes place in an exposed zero-sum
courtroom contest where one side wins (and one side loses)
everything.
Here’s an example. There is a segment of the eyewitnessexoneration list that catalogs trial prosecutors’ failures to turn
over exculpatory material. It does not show that those prosecutors lusted to frame known innocents, but rather it illuminates an impulse to shape the adversary trial inspection stage
so that it comes out (from the prosecutors’ perspective) the
“right” way. Sometimes, prosecutors don’t disclose eyewitness
exculpatory material because they simply don’t understand
what factors are influential in eyewitness performance.
Sometimes, prosecutors withhold information to convict the
men the prosecutors believe are guilty without interference
from “red herrings” that defense lawyers might manufacture
out of dissonant facts.
The trial prosecutors in the wrongful-conviction Brady
cases, like workers in most production processes, evidently
adopted a “covert work system.”39 They decided to evade formal disclosure requirements and buried alternative narratives
because they believed sharing the exculpatory facts would
interfere with achieving what they saw as the “real” goal tac-

35. Id. at 18.
36. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests
of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992).
37. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 35-49. Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That
Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the Limits of Cross-

Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727 (2007).
38. ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS
RIGHT, 185 (2009).
39. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011); David D.
Woods, Conflicts Between Learning and Accountability in Patient
Safety, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 485 (2005).
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itly assigned to them by officials (or the public) to whom
they
were
accountable.
Turning a blind eye to these
practices
encourages
upstream tunnel vision by
rewarding practitioners’ surrender to tunnel vision with a
“cleaner” trial inspection for
the hypothesis that they prematurely decided is accurate.
Tunnel vision is a “cause” of wrongful convictions, but tunnel
vision is also an effect of the sharp-end operators’ discomfort
with the demands of the end-stage inspection machinery. A
resulting wrongful conviction is an “organizational accident”:
the police make the wrong choice; the prosecutors buy it too
quickly; and the defense and the jury are crippled in their
inspectors’ roles.
One of the lessons of the eyewitness-exoneration cases is
that judges must develop (and incorporate in their inspectionstage calculations) an awareness of the gravitational pull away
from comprehensive and transparent investigation that is
always acting on production-stage practitioners. Science-conscious judges can put a brake on this rush down the “organizational-accident” tunnel by making it clear that they know
what matters in eyewitness-evidence collection and that they
will insist on detailed documentation and disclosure. The story
model of aggregating eyewitness factors cannot work if details
(e.g., confidence-boosting comments, exposure to co-witnesses, neglected alternative suspects) are not available to be
considered as part of the story. Diagnosing eyewitness errors
requires weighing not just catastrophic contradictions (e.g.,
the defendant is tall, the crime-night police report described a
midget) but also small narrative details (e.g., brief exposures to
co-witness accounts, or mug-book pictures of the defendant)
that accumulate and ultimately constitute the story of inadvertently corrupted eyewitness memory traces.
The categorical exclusion of identification evidence because
of misconduct may become less frequent as law enforcement
gradually absorbs and adapts the modern “system variable”
science. But pretrial hearings that will allow the trial judge to
assess (on some basis other than laconic police reports) the
source and quality of the eyewitness evidence that is not
excluded and to decide which judicial tools—for example, in
limine edits of evidence, cautionary instructions—will assist
the jurors’ story-model inspection and will become more
important.40 Unless alert and informed judges play an active
role in protecting these aspects of story-model testing, sharpend practitioners worried about inspections will simply shift
from “don’t turn it over” to “don’t write it down,” a practice
that will end up hampering not only inspectors, but their fellow investigator-producers, who could be exploring alternative
theories and correcting their tunnel vision.

“Judges cannot
dictate all the
choices made by
the system’s other
actors, but they
can influence
them.”

40. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
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JUDICIAL-SYSTEM LEADERS: BEYOND INSPECTION

There is no arrangement of gears and switches in criminal
justice, no system in that sense that we can reach for and fix
with a wrench or a hammer. But, like it or not, the world of
criminal justice is a complex functioning ecosystem like a
pond or a swamp where well-meaning actions on this coast can
have disastrous, unanticipated impacts on the far shore.
Ignoring this fact will fulfill the axiom that the cause of problems is solutions. Judges cannot dictate all the choices made by
the system’s other actors, but they can influence them. In fact,
the nature of the system guarantees that judges cannot avoid
influencing those choices. Even judicial silence and inaction
will always have an impact.
There is opportunity as well as danger in this interdependency of criminal justice’s operators. A recent episode in the
history of the “friendly and energetic alliance” provides an
example. Law-enforcement practitioners were intrigued in the
aftermath of the DNA exonerations by the potential of the
“double-blind sequential” system-variable approach, but they
were uncomfortable that it had not been tested in the field. A
well-meaning, go-it-alone attempt by the general counsel of
the Chicago Police Department to conduct a field study to fill
the gap resulted in a kind of scientific travesty.41 But when an
actual alliance of science and law enforcement was formed by
a team composed of researchers, the Police Foundation, the
Center for Problem-Solving Policing, and the American
Judicature Society to design and execute a scientifically rigorous field examination of the issue, it largely vindicated the
hopes of the advocates of that reform.
In the process of organizing the study the researchers developed—and the frontline practitioners tested the practicality
of—a laptop-housed program that allows for both the effective
administration and the meticulous documentation of doubleblind sequential eyewitness-identification procedures. Seen
from the system level, this is an example of errors spurring us
to learn how the conditions facing the sharp-end investigators
and the inspecting trial courts could both be substantially
improved by an investment made by officials distant from the
scene in cooperatively identifying and disseminating a relatively simple (and relatively inexpensive) technological
improvement. As we enter an era in which every patrol car will
have a laptop and every court will face subtle eyewitness evidentiary issues, this is a development that all of the operators
jointly responsible for eyewitness “organizational accidents”
can work together to accelerate. Recognizing that the judiciary
doesn’t draft law-enforcement budgets or vote on law-enforcement appropriations isn’t quite the same thing as saying that the
judiciary can’t find ways to signal its support for such an effort.
But it is also worth focusing for a moment on the practice of
nonblaming learning from error, apart from that practice’s
immediate products.
Working steadily on “organizational-accident” error analysis can create an increased system consciousness among the
practitioners who staff the components of the criminal process.

41. Daniel Schacter et al., Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness
Identifications in the Field, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 4 (2007).

A disciplined commitment to non-blaming, team analysis of
error can lay the foundation for mobilizing the new ideal of
continuous quality improvement that is transforming the culture of contemporary medicine in criminal justice.
Inspection of the prosecution’s case during an adversary
trial before a lay jury is a permanent feature of our system. It
expresses fundamental American convictions about the relationship between the accused individual and the state. But the
goal of the trial process is to protect this innocent citizen from
the state. The DNA exonerations have raised concerns about
the adversary trial’s weaknesses even in that specific role,42 but
no one ever claimed that the trial’s role is to analyze the investigative and charging processes and make them more reliable
in future cases. A jury that believes that it has caught a faulty
investigation says “not guilty” and nothing more. Appellate
courts review the legal procedures; they do not reconsider the
facts, and their review is entirely backward looking. Both are
necessarily uninformative.
The criminal justice system currently lacks the capacity for
“forward-looking accountability”43 that not only catches past
mistakes, but also anticipates and precludes future ones.
The challenge for the judiciary presented by a new “organizational-accident” understanding of how eyewitness errors
happen is not protecting a presumptively safe system from the
misconduct of sloppy (or even evil) human components—the
approach taken by the Warren Court in its misconduct-based
suppression cases. The challenge judges will confront is how
to invigorate and support a culture of constant, routine attention to safety and reliability in the criminal process.
The missing weapon in our approach to error is not the
once-in-a-decade, blue-ribbon panel of dignitaries at the
chief justice and superintendent level, convened to redesign
the architecture of the criminal justice system. We have
examples of that vehicle now, and the judiciary has played a
leading role in several of them.44 When the goal is changing
structural elements of the system by legislation or rulemaking, the political heft of those high-ranking players can be
useful, even essential.45
What we are missing is a consistent commitment to regular,
routine review of known errors and “near misses,” conducted
by experienced practitioners and stakeholders (for example,
victims’ rights professionals) supplemented where appropriate
by subject-matter experts and (at least in the beginning) by
specialists in analyzing the sources of system error and in the
error-review process itself. As Lucien Leape argued in his seminal essay Error in Medicine:
The emphasis is on routine. Only when error is accepted
as an inevitable, although manageable, part of everyday
practice will it be possible to shift from a punitive to a
creative frame of mind that seeks out and identifies the
underlying system failures.46

For many reasons the best
“Working
hope for breathing life into the
steadily on
“friendly and energetic alliance
in the noble cause of justice”
‘organizationalmay lie in the judiciary: in
accident’ error
judges who exercise their
analysis can
power to convene criminal justice stakeholders outside their
create an
familiar adversary bunkers. The increased system
alliance can serve the noble
cause not only by asking the consciousness....”
system’s actors to do a better
job playing “Whac-A-Mole”
and catching past errors one at a time, but also by asking them
to uncover and address the abiding latent weaknesses of the
system that will survive to cause future errors.
What if, when the next wrongful eyewitness conviction is
revealed, the local judiciary amazes the world by calling for a
dispassionate, all-stakeholders examination of the error? Or
what if, when DNA results come back from the lab six months
after an arrest and show that law enforcement arrested the
wrong guy on the night of the crime, the judges suggest that a
team examination of this “near miss” might pay dividends,
both in terms of what worked and what nearly didn’t?
Just as all aviation-industry participants and the public
expect the National Transportation Safety Board to convene a
mixed team of specialists to give an account of what happened
when a plane goes down, criminal practitioners and the public
could learn to expect that we will marshal a team including an
investigator or patrol supervisor, a prosecutor, a forensic scientist, a defender, a judge, a victims’ representative, and the
jurisdiction’s risk management officers, joined by additional
specialists as needed, in a nonblaming process of dissecting the
record of what happened and sharing the account they have
developed. The goal would be to understand the gritty facts, to
do the sort of clinical fact-finding that inevitably suffers when
everyone in a turf-conscious, blue-ribbon group is anxiously
looking over his or her shoulder at potentially sweeping and
unwelcome law reforms.
Continually working on improving system reliability means
changing the system’s culture, not just its architecture.
Overhauling institutional arrangements, identifying best
lineup practices, and devising checklists, as difficult as these
tasks might be, are the easy parts. Working on changing the
culture means concentrating on giving a primary place to
workmanship and professionalism instead of blame and discipline. It means learning—as medicine learned—to treat errors
as “sentinel events” to be studied, not as embarrassments to be
buried.
The history of the eyewitness cases illuminates the potential
in a coherent program of nonblaming learning from error that

42. Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64
VANDERBILT L. REV. 143 (2011).
43. Virginia A. Sharpe, Promoting Patient Safety: An Ethical Basis for
Policy Deliberations, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT
NO. 33 (2003).
44. See Christine C. Mumma, The North Carolina Actual Innocence

Commission: Uncommon Perspectives Joined by a Common Cause,
52 DRAKE L. REV. 647 (2004).
45. Stephen Saloom, Adversaries as Allies: Joining Together to Prevent
Criminal Injustice, 73 ALBANY L. REV. 1235 (2010).
46. Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1854 (1994).
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includes the evaluation of “near misses,” and offers rewards
both within local systems and across scattered systems. A common national template for error review, enacted locally and
informed and challenged by diverse local experiences, could
substantially mitigate the fragmentation of American criminal
justice.
These advantages can be multiplied if a simple mechanism—a clearinghouse, or a wiki-style community of practitioners, researchers, and policymakers—could be developed
for distributing and commenting on the reports of errors.47
Reading of a distant system’s experience of completed accidents can alert currently isolated practitioners to the operation
of dangerous latent features in their own local systems.
Reading studies of remote “near misses” can reveal both those
dangerous latent features and potential fail-safe devices or procedures that are not present locally, but which provided
resilience and kept the near miss in another jurisdiction from
becoming a tragic “hit.” It can counteract the tendency of
today’s best practice to calcify into a ceiling that blocks future
improvements.
After an exoneration it is often very easy to see in hindsight
where a wrong decision was made. But congratulating ourselves on recognizing past bad choices won’t get us very far. We
have to learn why the last bad decision looked like a good decision from the perspective of the mistaken detective or prosecutor or defender or judge at the time it was made. If we don’t,
the root causes of the last tragedy will continue to lie in wait
for the next decision maker who comes along. Accounts of
eyewitness wrongful-conviction cases give striking evidence of
how much we could learn about latent system defects from a
close, all-stakeholders analysis that incorporates the scientific
contributions48 that follow in this issue and the operations-oriented insights of the sharp-end participants who do the work
on the streets and in the courts.
The judiciary is uniquely well placed to stake out the common ground on which criminal-justice-system actors could
meet, to invite the participants onto that ground, and to help
them to defend that ground against the short-term pressures
for public pillories filled with scapegoats.
The DNA exonerations have killed the illusion of an infallible justice system forever. From now on, the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system in the public’s eye will depend significantly on that system’s willingness to confront its own failures.49 We will never have an exact count of those failures, but
when the most careful analyses we can muster suggest that the
wrongful-conviction rate may be as high as 6-15% in sexualassault cases,50 the exact count becomes almost irrelevant. All
of us in criminal justice have some explaining to do, and we
could start by explaining our practices to each other, without
trying to point fingers and assign blame.
We have some prevention to do as well. When medicine

adopted its new approach to iatrogenic “sentinel events” and
moved toward self-consciously creating a culture of safety, it
quickly saved 120,000 patients’ lives in eighteen months.51 The
eyewitness cases, with their wrongfully convicted defendants
and their wrongfully free perpetrators (and the later victims
those perpetrators find) make a strong argument that the criminal justice system’s natural leaders—the judges—armed with
an important body of scientific knowledge available for application, could do some leading in that direction.

47. See Doyle, supra note 24.
48. An excellent comprehensive analysis of the scientific literature
bearing on the criminal process as a whole is found at DAN SIMON,
IN DOUBT (2012).
49. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW:
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND COMPLIANCE (2006).

50. JOHN ROMAN, KELLY WALSH, PAMELA LACHMAN & JENNIFER YAHNER,
POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING AND WRONGFUL CONVICTION 57
(2012).
51. CHARLES KENNEY, THE BEST PRACTICE: HOW THE NEW QUALITY
MOVEMENT IS TRANSFORMING MEDICINE 270-272 (2008).
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